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Summary 
This working paper explores how Belgium reacted to the growth of this new form of terrorism from 
its early signs in the 1980s until today. Next, it analyses the measures taken by the Belgian law 
enforcement apparatus since 9/11. Finally, it assesses Belgian specificities in combating jihadi 
terrorism. 
 
Introduction 
Belgium is not a significant safe haven for terrorist groups, according to the 2006 edition of the 
Country Reports on Terrorism, released by the U.S. State Department in April 2007. Belgium is 
only a piece in a global puzzle of terrorism, including its jihadi variant that gained worldwide 
prominence with the 9/11 attacks. 
 
In the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, Belgium bore its share of the burden of terrorism, as 
did some of its neighbours. The Cellules Communistes Combattantes were the Belgian branch of a 
Europe-wide movement of anti-capitalist terrorism that caused widespread anxiety in public 
opinion. In the mid-1980s, much earlier than most of its neighbours (with the exception of France) 
Belgium then encountered a new variety of terrorists, religiously inspired groups, linked with the 
Shia regime in Teheran. Subsequently in the mid-1990s Belgian authorities discovered support cells 
of the Algerian radical Islamist movement GIA on its soil. These were the beginnings of Belgium’s 
encounter with jihadi terrorism. 
 
Jihadi terrorism went through different mutations. It started as an ‘Islamo-nationalist’ movement in 
the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. It then acquired a global character, with al-Qaeda as the 
vanguard organisation of international jihadi terrorism. As a result of international and national 
efforts the organisation started to atomize and gave way to a decentralized, largely home-grown 
patchwork of jihadi groups, linked by ideology and opportunistic links. 
 
This working paper1 explores how Belgium reacted to the growth of this new form of terrorism 
from its early signs in the 1980s until today. Next, it analyses the measures taken by the Belgian 
law enforcement apparatus since 9/11. Finally, it assesses Belgian specificities in combating jihadi 
terrorism. 
 
A Historical Overview 
 
The Belgian police started to investigate the field of political Islam in the mid-1980s, after a series 
of terrorist attacks in Paris in 1986, committed by the ‘Fouad Ali Saleh’ network, related to the 
Iranian regime. Up until that moment only the civilian intelligence agency, the State Security 
Service, had been studying the issue, in particular the Muslim Brotherhood. The emergence of this 
new form of terrorism, linked to religion, led to the establishment of a specific entity entirely 
dedicated to radical Islamism, within the existing Anti-Terrorist Unit of the Gendarmerie. At that 
time, the investigators only had a very rough and superficial understanding of the new phenomenon, 
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since they had been focusing on the anti-capitalist terrorist threat with which Belgium was 
confronted in the early 1980s. As we will see below, for the Belgian police and law enforcement 
community a ‘real learning process’ started.2 
 
Belgian authorities soon realised how complex the issue was. In the 1970s, Turkish and Moroccan 
communities in Belgium had gone trough a profound identity crisis due to the declining economic 
fortunes of the first wave of immigrants from these countries. This manifested itself in a religious 
revival, particularly under the influence of an orthodox dawa-strand of Islam, Jamâ’at al-Tablîgh. In 
the 1980s, a more political expression gained traction within these communities under the influence 
of members of the Muslim Brotherhood who had fled repression in Egypt and Syria. 
 
Simultaneously, when the former Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 a solidarity movement 
among Muslims worldwide developed. From Belgium too, individuals joined the resistance against 
the Soviet occupation, sometimes by their own means, sometimes facilitated by nascent networks, 
such as the Mekhtab Al-Khidemat Al-Mujahideen (‘The Office of Services for the Mujahedeen’), 
created by Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam in 1982. 
In the early 1990s, France and Belgium were among the first European countries to be confronted 
with the aftermath of the Afghan war through its consequences in Algeria. In 1992 the Algerian 
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) failed to conquer power via the ballot box. The cancellation of the 
electoral process by the Algerian military in January 1992 led to the advent of ‘islamo-nationalist’ 
activism by the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), with Algerian veterans from the Afghan jihad playing 
a prominent role. This terrorist organisation conducted an increasingly violent campaign against 
civilians and officials, massacring hundreds of thousands of Algerians.  
 
Belgian police soon discovered that the Algerian GIA had established cells for propaganda and 
fund-raising activities in Belgium too. In 1995 the first concrete result of the joint police and 
intelligence cooperation was the dismantlement of the Zaoui network, a terrorist network linked to 
the bombing campaign in France that was to follow soon after, in the summer of 1995. In March 
already the Belgian authorities had thus arrested a dozen GIA members, including the former 
Algerian FIS-leader Ahmed Zaoui and the Tunesian Tarek ben Habib Maaroufi. The network was 
created with the aim of providing logistical support to GIA’s armed activities in Algeria, but was 
nevertheless also clearly linked to the broader Afghan veterans’ diaspora, since members of the 
Zaoui-network had been travelling to the Afghan-Pakistan border. More significantly, Belgian 
investigators discovered the first ever jihadi manual, 8,000 pages long, produced by the 
aforementioned Mekhtab Al-Khidemat and dedicated to Osama bin Laden. Zaoui and Maaroufi 
were sentenced to respectively five and three years in prison (for Maaroufi with a conditional 
suspension of sentence).  
 
Two years later, this ‘Islamo-nationalist’ phase of the early jihadi networks had moved into a 
definitely globalising phase, linked to what was to become al-Qaeda. The failure of national 
attempts to install Islamist regimes in Algeria, Egypt and Syria furthered the development of a 
mythical global Ummah as a rallying cry for Islamists worldwide. Afghanistan became the hub of 
jihadi terrorists. In March 1998, a second jihadi network was dismantled in Belgium (operation 
‘Lock’). Dubbed the Mellouk-network, the arrest of Farid Mellouk and several other jihadis was 
made possible thanks to simultaneous indications from the Belgian, British and Italian intelligence 
services. It indicated how multinational jihadi terrorism had now become. Involving terrorists from 
numerous countries in the Middle East, it was also linked with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Many of 
the terrorists involved had sojourned in training camps in Afghanistan, including in camps run by 
al-Qaeda. 
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During the police raid another important jihadi document was recovered. It was a pamphlet of some 
60 pages representing what might be called the ‘birth certificate’ of the Moroccan Groupe islamique 
combattant marocain (GICM), a group based along the model of the GIA. Farid Mellouk was 
convicted to nine years in Belgium. 
 
Increasingly, the Afghanistan scene became the primary motive of international jihadi networking. 
On 9 September 2001, Ahmad Shah Massoud, leader of the anti-Taliban rebellion in Afghanistan, 
nicknamed ‘lion of the Panjshir’, was killed by two suicide bombers. The attackers, who died in the 
attack, were Abdesattar Dahmane and Baraoui El Ouaer, two Tunisians illegally living in Belgium. 
But the real organisers of the network were Omar Sliti and the aforementioned Maaroufi. They 
were all members of the Tunisian Combat Group, a Tunisian jihadi group that acted as a logistical 
network connected to the Pakistani-Afghani zone, but also to Northern Iraq (Ansar al-Islam). The 
network was completely dismantled in November 2001 (operation ‘Mezze’) and Maaroufi arrested 
for the second time in December 2001 (operation ‘Goal’). 
 
Two days after the September 11 attacks, Nizar Trabelsi was arrested in Brussels for involvement in 
an alleged suicide attack against the NATO air force base at Kleine Brogel – or the American 
embassy in Paris (operation ‘Wawa’). Trabelsi was a former professional football player from 
Tunisian origin. His football career had not been very successful. He became a cocaine addict and 
got involved in petty crime, went to prison and was radicalised while in prison through the activities 
of the Takfir wal-Hijra movement. He went to Afghanistan, met Osama bin Laden and came back 
to Belgium, tasked by bin Laden with setting up a jihadi network.  
 
Trabelsi was linked to Maaroufi, but also to Djamel Beghal, who allegedly planned the Paris 
embassy plot and recruited people for al-Qaeda,3 and to Richard Reid, the ‘shoe bomber’, who 
attempted to detonate a bomb on American Airlines flight 63 between Paris and Miami on 22 
December 2001. Maaroufi and Trabelsi were both sentenced in 2003, respectively to six (later to be 
increased to seven) and ten years in prison. Other members of the network were convicted with 
sentences ranging from two to five years in jail. 
 
The 1998-2001 period represented the apex of al-Qaeda-dominated international jihadi terrorism. 
Cells all over Europe, including in Belgium, were acting directly under the direction and 
supervision of al-Qaeda and its two mentors, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri. But the 
military campaign in Afghanistan that followed the September 11 attacks and the ensuing 
international counterterrorist cooperation broke the backbone of the once disciplined and 
hierarchical network, which had operated under a strong central leadership that controlled almost all 
aspects of its operations. The network started to atomise. Some Afghan veterans were able to 
escape through Turkey and Syria and settled in Europe (the so-called ‘exfiltration of Afghan 
fighters’). Once in Europe they launched their local jihad on European soil, creating and 
maintaining sleeper cells, assisting other cells if needed, recruiting, preparing or committing terror 
plots in their host country. But local dynamics became increasingly important, boosting apparently 
autonomous or independent cells not affiliated, supervised or backed, but only inspired by the 
potent al-Qaeda mythology. 
 
The so-called ‘Maaseik network’, which was dismantled in 2004, offers a good example of these 
post-Afghan networks. A group of militants, structured around Afghan veterans, was discovered 
living in Maaseik, a small town a few miles from the Dutch and German borders. The network 
formed a mix of foreigners and locals, Moroccans and Belgians of Moroccan descent. Some had 
                                                 
3 Beghal was arrested at Dubai International Airport in July 2001 and was extradited to France in September 2001. In 
2005 he was sentenced to ten years in prison. 
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been trained in Afghanistan, while others were recruited in Belgium. They were linked to the 
loosely knit GICM, the same group that had first appeared in Belgium in 1998. In 2004, Belgian 
police launched a series of raids throughout the country (operation ‘Asparagus’, after the vegetable 
grown in the region), dismantling the sophisticated network, which in one way or another may have 
been linked to the Casablanca and the Madrid bombers. The militants were also suspected of trying 
to recruit fighters for the insurgency in Iraq. Although they did not plan a terrorist attack on Belgian 
soil, they formed a well organised logistical support cell, providing for false papers, hideouts, etc. 
This trial was the first to be based upon the new 2003 counterterrorism law criminalizing terrorist 
acts and membership of terrorist groups. Three of the thirteen defendants were sentenced to a prison 
term of six to eight years and six received three to five years. 
 
Parallel to this Afghan-linked jihadi movement, counterterrorism experts in the police and the State 
Security Service had also been noticing a growing radicalisation process amongst deprived 
youngsters in immigrant communities, especially from North-African descent. This process that had 
started in the 1990s was likely to increase in the years to come, an internal police report in 2001 
forecasted.  
 
If and how this homegrown radicalisation process was going to plug in into the larger jihadi cause 
was a main worry for Belgian investigators. In the run-up to the 2003 Iraq war, the State Security 
Service had therefore warned about potential consequences for Belgium. The war and its aftermath 
indeed enhanced the radicalisation process, as police officers in the field witnessed. By adding a 
new layer of frustration within Muslim communities worldwide, it also pushed jihadi terrorism into 
a new dimension, which was part of the ongoing atomisation of the old al-Qaeda network: a 
bottom-up terrorist dynamic by self-radicalising groups and individuals, no longer directed by al-
Qaeda but inspired by its ideology. Self-recruitment in Europe now appears to have become at least 
as important a source of jihadi recruitment as semi-organised international networking. These 
home-grown terrorists – sometimes small groups of friends, sometimes ‘lone wolfs’ – can prove to 
be as dangerous as any known group, if not more so, because they operate under the radar screen. A 
number of more or less spontaneous networks thus emerged, often based on kinship, conveying 
militants to Iraq. 
 
The most well-known case in Belgium is the Muriel Degauque-network (2006), named after a 
Belgian woman that carried out a suicide attack against an American military patrol in Iraq on 9 
November 2005. The network was linked to the now deceased jihadi leader al-Zarqawi and had 
been under investigation for more than four months. The suicide attack prompted the authorities to 
speed up the investigation. Three weeks later the homes of different cell members were raided in 
Brussels, Charleroi, Tongeren, and Antwerp. Some fifteen persons were arrested. Their trial is due 
to begin at the end of 2007. 
 
Glenn Audenaert, the leading Belgian police official in charge of counterterrorism, once described 
jihadi terrorism as ‘patchwork of self-radicalising local groups with international contacts, but 
without any central engine and any central organisational design’. Today’s jihadi terrorism is thus 
not very dissimilar from the anti-capitalist terrorist groups in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s – or 
from modern-day criminal networks for that matter, alternately cooperating and acting 
autonomously, depending upon the circumstances. The Belgian counterterrorism community now 
largely subscribes to this assessment. They view jihadi terrorism basically as a cloak patched 
together from different sources of local discontent, real and perceived, with a puritanical and radical 
interpretation of Islam providing the stitches and thriving on an enabling global momentum.  
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Enhanced Counterterrorism Capabilities 
 
From this bird’s-eye view of the Belgian experience with jihadi terrorism, from its early start in the 
mid-1980s until today, one can distinguish three interrelated characteristics that form the essence of 
the Belgian approach towards jihadi terrorism: empathy, the search for root causes, and a concern of 
not encroaching on fundamental rights. 
 
Before going into these core elements of the Belgian counterterrorism philosophy, we survey the 
state apparatus’ reaction to the jihadi threat. 
 
Belgium’s EU Presidency on 9/11 
Like all EU member states, Belgium swiftly condemned the attacks on September 11. A day later, 
Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt publicly repeated this before the European Parliament. Moreover, 
holding the rotating six-month EU presidency at the time of the attacks, Belgium offered the EU to 
become the privileged and principal channel for trans-Atlantic cooperation on counterterrorism – in 
line with its long-held policy of strengthening the EU’s global role on the world scene. 
 
Holding the EU Presidency, Belgium thus immediately convened a meeting of the EU Heads of 
State and Government together with their Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This extraordinary 
European Council, which gathered on 21 September 2001, i.e. only ten days after the tragic events 
in New York, formally decided to step up EU action against terrorism, through a coordinated and 
interdisciplinary approach, embracing all Union policies. To that end, it adopted a Plan of Action 
along five axes: strengthening police and judicial cooperation, developing international legal 
instruments, combating the financing of terrorism, strengthening air security and coordinating the 
EU’s global action. With regard to the first of these axes the EU, still under Belgian presidency, 
saw its police and judiciary cooperation enhanced. Crucially important among the measures taken 
were the elaboration of a common definition of terrorist offences and the adoption of the European 
Arrest Warrant, facilitating intra-EU cooperation on terrorism and the prosecution of suspected 
terrorists. However, a Belgian proposal to create a European Intelligence Unit was not approved. 
Nevertheless the Belgian State Security Service obtained a consensus among its European 
intelligence colleagues to create a Counter-Terrorism Group. 
 
With this Action Plan and its accompanying measures, Belgium thus laid down the basic principles 
upon which the succeeding EU Presidencies were going to build to further develop the EU policy 
against terrorism. These benchmarks can be broadly summarized as follows: the fight against 
terrorism requires a comprehensive approach by the international community, comprising legal, 
political, economic, diplomatic and military means, fully respecting the rule of law and in 
accordance with respective domestic laws, duly taking into account underlying factors (or ‘root 
causes’) without acknowledging these as justifications for terrorist activities. This comprehensive 
approach implies also the need for enhancing dialogue and broadening the understanding among 
cultures and civilizations. The EU rejects as a principle any attempt to stereotype terrorism or 
associate it with any religion, race, nationality or ethnic group. Finally, the EU recognizes the 
central role of the UN in establishing standards for combating terrorism and providing a forum for 
coordinated action. 
 
State Adaptation to the Jihadi Threat 
Preparedness to and the physical prevention of terrorist attacks are the obvious first level of any 
counterterrorism strategy. As in all European countries, in Belgium too the capabilities for dealing 
with terrorism have been significantly enhanced since 9/11. Budgets and personnel have been 
increased. Legal provisions have been streamlined along the European framework decisions and the 
relevant UN resolutions with their implementing European instruments. Investigative procedures 
have been enhanced. Bilateral agreements, including with the United States, have been concluded. 
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In Belgium, terrorism has traditionally been chiefly the responsibility of the intelligence service, but 
with an increasing involvement of other actors. After 9/11, all services involved were strengthened. 
Next to the intelligence service, the central players of the Belgian counterterrorism apparatus 
became: the federal prosecutor (whose office was created in May 2002), assisted by the terrorism 
unit in Brussels (PJF/OA3) and the ‘terrorism and sects’ unit within the judicial police (DGJ/DJP). 
The federal police works in close cooperation with the two intelligence services, the (civilian) State 
Security Service, supervised by the Minister of Justice, and the (military) General Intelligence and 
Security Service, supervised by the Minister of Defence. On the ground the collaboration between 
the federal police and the civilian intelligence service has always been excellent and since 2003 it is 
so on all levels. Even if operational difficulties remain, the cooperation with military intelligence 
has also been improved and was sealed by a formal agreement in November 2004. In 2005, the 
relations between the federal prosecutor, the police and the intelligence community were further 
streamlined and the division of counterterrorism tasks was fine-tuned, under the stewardship of the 
federal prosecutor. 
 
The civilian intelligence service personnel have been increased by twenty percent and its budget 
nearly doubled since 2003. The terrorism unit’s personnel at the police have been tripled since 
2001. Moreover,  several magistrates and 13 investigative judges – Belgian ‘Balthazar Garzons’ – 
who conduct investigations related to counterterrorism, were appointed. This was the consequence 
of a significant rise in terrorism-related investigations in 2006, with 106 new files compared to 89 
in 2005. The number of judicial investigations also went up: from 14 in 2005 to 26 in 2006. Each 
investigation is overseen by the specialised investigative judges. 
 
After 9/11, Belgium also started to add legislative and judicial tools to its existing means to combat 
terrorism. In January 2003, Minister of Justice Marc Verwilghen submitted a Governmental Act to 
Parliament that would henceforth regulate by law the ‘special investigation methods’ enhancing 
police capabilities for search and surveillance (wiretapping, infiltration measures, resort to 
informers, special observation measures). As will be described underneath, this Act was partly 
annulled by the Court of Arbitration (Constitutional Court), re-submitted in October 2005 and 
finally adopted in December 2005. Belgian police forces now dispose of a particularly advanced 
legal system in the field of pro-active work. Specific to the Belgian approach is the permanent 
control of the application of the special investigation measures by the judicial branch. However, a 
bill containing the same possibilities for the two intelligence services is still pending in Parliament. 
A main issue that will have to be settled before this bill can be adopted, is the question whether the 
actual jihadi (and general terrorist) threat warrants such infringement upon existing procedures and 
principles. 
 
Belgian anti-terrorism legislation was adopted on 19 December 2003 (Articles 137 to 141ter of the 
Criminal Code)4 implementing the EU’s Framework Decision of June 2002 on combating terrorism 
and the European Arrest Warrant. The law criminalizes a terrorist act and association with terrorists 
and imposes a prison sentence of up to twenty years and in certain cases life sentence (when related 
to NBCR).  
 
To better coordinate the information of the different branches and agencies involved in terrorism-
related issues a new ‘nerve centre’ has been created by law in 2006: OCAM (Organe de 
Coordination et d’Analyse de la Menace), under the joint authority of the Ministers of Justice and 
the Interior. In July 2001 already the idea to create an enhanced inter-services counterterrorism 
                                                 
4 Up to 2003 terrorism was not as such included as a misdemeanour in the Belgian penal code. Sentences were obtained 
based upon peripheral offences of common law. The Act has been challenged before the Court of Arbitration 
(Constitutional Court), which however dismissed the appeal on 13 July 2005. 
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entity had been floated by Antoine Duquesne, Minister of the Interior, but its implementation was 
speeded up by the 9/11 attacks.5 
 
Its main task is to centralize and coordinate the information flows not only between the different 
law enforcement services, but also Foreign Affairs, the Treasury, Customs and the Interior. 
Moreover, OCAM conducts a general analysis and evaluation of the threat. The first head of 
OCAM is Jean-Claude Delepière, a magistrate and former head of the Senate’s Committee for the 
control of the intelligence services (1999-2006). His Deputy is Luc Verheyden, the former head of 
the GIA (Groupe Interforces Anti-terroriste), who thus ensures the consistency with the earlier 
Belgian counterterrorism efforts. OCAM indeed replaces the former GIA that was created in the 
beginning of the 1980s in the wake of the Palestinian terrorist attacks in France (against the 
Goldenberg restaurant and a bookshop in de Rue des Rosiers in Paris) and the anti-capitalist 
terrorist attacks in Belgium of the early 1980s. Contrary to the former GIA, where the inter-service 
cooperation was voluntary, services and departments are now obliged to share their information 
within OCAM, lest they be prosecuted under criminal law.  
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs too has increased its involvement in counterterrorism. In 2005 an 
Anti-Terrorism unit was created within the MFA. It was tasked with the coordination of the 
information from its embassies abroad for use by OCAM and other relevant authorities in Belgium. 
 
Furthermore, since 1991 the two intelligence services and now also OCAM are submitted to outside 
inspection by the aforementioned Committee I.6 The watchdog for Belgium's intelligence services 
works under the direction of the Belgian Senate. The control concerns the internal rules and 
guidelines and all the documents related to the behaviour of its employees, methods and activities.7 
According to the latest report of the Committee I, published in April 2007, the intelligence services 
are operating more effectively than before, possess a good theoretical knowledge of radical 
Islamism (and jihadism), but need more means and staff to effectively deal with terrorist threats. 
 
Beyond the federal police and the intelligence services, the government can also count on the help 
of the Governmental Coordination and Crisis Centre, created in April 1988, with Koen Dassen as 
its first head. The Centre assists the authorities in the planning and interdepartmental management 
of large-scale crises (such as terrorist attacks and emergencies of all sorts) on Belgian soil.8 The 
centre is also an important partner for the private sector in protecting the economy and vital 
infrastructure against terrorist attacks. This collaboration resulted among others in an early-warning 
system and the publication of a brochure, Terrorism and extremism: What measures can firms 
take?9 The centre works 24 hours a day, seven days a week and in case of a crisis coordinates the 
national level and supports the local and regional authorities. OCAM, evaluating the threat on a 
daily basis, is of course a very important partner of the crisis centre.  
 
In line with the UN, the EU and, especially, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) rulings, 
Belgium has increased its efforts to detect and block the financing of terrorism as well, albeit this 
aspect is considered to be of lesser importance in the overall effort, since the sums involved in 
                                                 
5 La politique de sécurité après les attentats terroristes aux États-Unis d'Amérique. Rapport fait au nom de la 
Commission de l’Intérieur et des Affaires administratives. Sénat, 2-924/1, 16 October 2001. 
6 This Committee I (officially named Permanent Committee for the Control on the Intelligence Services) comprises a 
three member panel, appointed for five years and with a magistrate as its president, plus a clerk, an administrative cell 
and an investigation team. Every year the Committee writes a report on the activities of the intelligence services and 
makes suggestions to improve the functioning of the services. 
7 Jean-Claude Delepière, ‘Le comité permanent de contrôle des services de renseignement’, in : La Sûreté. Essais sur les 
175 ans de la Sûreté de l’Etat. Brussels, Politeia, 2005, p. 225. 
8 Belgium has a four-phase alert system: phases one and two are at the local level, phase three is a provincial plan and 
phase four refers to a national alert.  
9 Rapport d’activités 2005. Brussels, Interior Ministry, Direction générale Politique de Sécurité et de Prévention, 2006, 
p. 51. 
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recent terrorist attacks are of modest proportion. Based on the anti-money-laundering law of 1993 
and enforced by the Belgian Financial Intelligence Processing Unit, the financial dimension of 
counterterrorism falls under the joint supervision of the Ministers of Justice and Finance. This unit 
collects and analyzes financial data about possible terrorist links. The Treasury is responsible for 
freezing assets belonging to suspected terrorists. As a result, assets of certain persons and entities 
associated with Osama bin Laden, the al-Qaeda network and the Taliban have been frozen these 
past years. Most of the suspected transactions however have been cleared from terrorism links. 
 
Furthermore, Belgian authorities have also enhanced their anti-terrorist cooperation with the U.S. 
on multiple levels, either bilaterally, or as a member state of the European Union. Bilaterally, 
Belgian authorities have joined several American initiatives. For instance, in June 2002, the port of 
Antwerp joined the Department of Homeland Security’s Container Security Initiative, that aims at 
ensuring that maritime cargo containers posing a terrorism risk are identified and examined at 
foreign ports before they are shipped to the United States. Zeebrugge followed in 2004. U.S. 
Customs agents with their Belgian counterparts screen containers to be loaded on vessels bound for 
the United States.  
 
Finally, Belgium also contributes in military terms to the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) in Afghanistan, with a troop presence of some 400 and 4 F-16’s in 2007.  
 
Which Specificity in Belgian Counterterrorism Philosophy?10 
 
The set-up of Belgium’s counterterrorism apparatus is basically similar to that of its European 
neighbours. The law enforcement paradigm that dominates the Belgian counterterrorism approach 
is also in line with Europe’s traditional attitude of tackling terrorism first and foremost through law 
enforcement techniques. Finally, Belgium’s refusal to describe jihadi terrorism in terms of an 
epochal struggle or to view it as the defining element of the 21st century is shared by most 
European countries as well, especially those who have experienced terrorism in their recent past. 
  
Nevertheless, some aspects of its counterterrorism approach and thinking set Belgium somewhat 
apart. We refer in particular to the three aforementioned characteristics: empathy, the search for 
root causes, and the acute concern for respecting fundamental rights. 
 
Empathy 
Alain Grignard, the leading expert on Islamist and jihadi terrorist groups within the Belgian police, 
describes the 1985-1992 period as ‘a real learning process for the Belgian police forces’.11 One of 
the main results of this early experience with this new variety of terrorism was the clearly felt 
necessity to fully grasp what drove its militants. One of the critical factors contributing to its 
success against jihadi terrorism, according to Grignard, is ‘the empathy one has to entertain with the 
subject at hand. This is a characteristic sensibility of some European countries, including Belgium. 
This empathy has to start with real knowledge of the “other”, first empirically, then scientifically, 
and has to be build upon the units’ contacts in the field. The approach has to be based on neurons, 
not hormones. Herein probably resides the real Belgian specificity when dealing with jihadi 
terrorism.’12 
 
As mentioned earlier, in the mid-1980s a specific entity entirely dedicated to radical Islamism was 
established within the existing Anti-Terrorism Unit of the police (then called the ‘Gendarmerie’). 
Police officers indeed realised the urgent need to understand the dynamics behind this new 
                                                 
10 The findings in the ensuing paragraphs are in part based upon the results of a four year terrorism research project at 
Ghent University, subsidized by the Fund for Scientific Research-Flanders. 
11 Grignard, note 1. 
12 Alain Grignard, ‘L’islamisme radical en Belgique, entre nationalisme et globalisation: une vision policière’, in: Studia 
Diplomatica, VX, 2007, Supplement 1. 
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expression of terrorism. Police officers enrolled in the university to study the Arabic language, 
Islamic/Arabic civilisation, and Islam, in order to get a grip on the issue. Contacts were established 
in the field and a close collaboration was forged with the units of the intelligence service, as well as 
with the local police. We got our education in the streets, as well as in academia, Grignard once 
quipped. 
 
From these early endeavours police and intelligence officers understood that the danger did not 
reside with the Muslim communities as such, but on the contrary that cooperation with them would 
be of crucial value in overcoming the common challenge posed by fringe groups at the margins of 
these communities, exploiting widely felt feelings of marginalisation in their midst.13 It ensued that 
often great care was given to using non-stigmatising language, both by political authorities and by 
the law enforcement community. This was all the more needed, since an extreme-right political 
party in the Dutch-speaking northern part of the country had been gaining strong electoral backing 
by capitalising on anti-migrant and anti-Muslim sentiments, thus enhancing an atmosphere charged 
with polarising rhetoric. Marino Keulen, the Flemish Minister in charge of integration, has warned 
too for the dwindling patience in immigrant communities and society alike.14 
 
Along the same lines, Koen Dassen, former head of the intelligence service, has always emphasised 
that already from the 1970s onwards Belgian governments had tried to make their citizens from 
Arab descent aware that the Belgian polity nourished no anti-Muslim or anti-Arab bias. The 
presence of communities with a Muslim background was indeed seen as an irreversible 
development that one had to acknowledge.15 As a result, Islam had become one of six religions 
officially recognized by the state, thus enjoying the same institutionalized rights as any other 
recognized religion, including the right to state subsidies, the right to religious instruction in public 
schools, the right to receive remuneration for the salaries of the clergy, the right to provide 
chaplains in prisons, hospitals and asylum reception centers and the right to broadcasting time on 
public TV and radio. In this process, the way Islam teaching has been organized in Belgium is seen 
as a model by Muslim communities in other EU countries.16 
 
Addressing the Root Causes 
The expertise gained through the early confrontation with Islamist radicals would soon prove to be 
of tremendous value when jihadi terrorism gained traction. Very early on already, police and 
intelligence officers had become aware that religion was not of the essence. Frustration was, they 
rapidly realized, combined with an identity quest. Herein lays the second Belgian counterterrorism 
characteristic: the need to understand and address its ‘root causes’. 
 
Frustration, according to Superintendent Grignard, is the main reason why Muslims radicalise into 
extremists.17 He has been a constant voice warning that one should avoid reinforcing the process of 
exclusion. In this, he is not a lonely voice within the law enforcement apparatus. His superior, 
Glenn Audenaert, and Koen Dassen, as head of the State Security Service, have all been conveying 
the same message. Within the counterterrorism community, the vicious circle of frustration and 
deprivation is largely seen as the main engine of radicalisation in Belgium.18  
 
Jihadi terrorism surfs on waves of bitterness, frustration and humiliation, according to Audenaert. 
‘These are the real “ground causes”. […] They have nothing to do with religion, save for serving as 
                                                 
13 Glenn Audenaert, in: Knack, 6 September 2007. 
14 Marino Keulen, in: De Morgen, 23 October 2004. 
15 Koen Dassen, in: Le Monde, 10 August 2004. 
16 Intolerance and discrimination against Muslims in the EU. Developments since September 11. Vienna, International 
Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, March 2005, pp. 23 and 39-48. 
17 Alain Grignard, in: De Tijd, 2 December 2005. 
18 For Koen Dassen, see note 14. Glenn Audenaert, in: Humo, 23 March 2004. 
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a lever to manipulate vulnerable people.’19 Police and intelligence officers have clearly been aware 
that already in the 1990s radicalisation was increasing among deprived youngsters from Arab origin 
– a sentiment in which their family’s Muslim background, their ethnic origin and their relative lack 
of opportunities formed a fertile combination for recruitment and – as it has appeared unmistakably 
since 2004 – self-radicalisation. In their city districts, police officers are feeling the impact of 
international events – such as the Iraq war, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or even the 2006 
Lebanon war – and notice how young people are drawn to jihadi theatres of war around the globe. 
 
As for individuals having a job still is the major vehicle for socialisation, the relative scarcity and 
especially the higher skills that are now required compared to post-war migratory waves, puts up 
higher barriers for today’s youngsters in immigrant communities. In parts of the immigrant 
communities, despair and discouragement nowadays prevail with regard to youngsters’ chances of 
overcoming this situation in the foreseeable future. There are indeed indications that, contrary to 
earlier migratory histories where the third generation in a sense ‘concluded’ the integration itinerary 
that their grandparents initiated, today’s grandchildren of immigrants dispose of less qualifications 
and language skills than their parents, the immigrants’ children. 
 
The attitude of the law enforcement apparatus is in line with the attitude of the Belgian government. 
Laurette Onkelinx, the Minister of Justice, declared during a May 2004  Parliamentary debate that 
the antiterrorism law enforcement forces would receive reinforcement to allow, among others, to 
profile and analyse the motives and reasons that form the ‘grass roots’ of terrorist recruitment.  
 
‘Root causes’ and more in particular the issue of radicalisation thus quite naturally became one of 
the major research topics for Egmont – The Royal Institute for International Relations, when at the 
end of 2002 it was tasked by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to closely monitor the issue of 
international terrorism. At the request of the Ministry and the Irish EU presidency, the Institute in 
2003 organised the first ever meeting of EU experts of the second (foreign and security policy) and 
third (justice and home affairs) pillar, together with representatives of intelligence services of the 
member states. The Irish presidency and the ensuing Dutch presidency took advantage of the results 
of this meeting. In 2004 two reports were produced by the terrorism working groups from the 
second and third pillar. These reports in turn influenced the development of the European strategy 
against radicalisation and recruitment, adopted in 2005.20 
 
This specific emphasis on root causes has always been part and parcel of Belgium’s participation in 
EU counterterrorism endeavours. Within the EU, Belgian diplomats and officials have continuously 
stressed the need to incorporate this dimension within the core of European counterterrorism 
efforts. As written earlier, the EU Action Plan of September 2001, adopted under the Belgian 
Presidency, already foresaw a set of accompanying measures in the fight against terrorism, through 
preventing and stabilising regional conflicts, by engaging in an in-depth political dialogue with 
countries and regions in which terrorism might arise, by pursuing the integration of all countries 
into a fair world system of security, prosperity and improved development, by combating any 
nationalist, racist and xenophobic drift and by strongly rejecting any equation of terrorism with the 
Arab and Muslim world. 
 
In the same spirit, after the 2004 Madrid attacks Belgian diplomats and officials insisted on 
including an objective addressing the factors which contribute to support for and recruitment into 
terrorism within the ‘EU strategic objectives to combat terrorism’, annexed to the Declaration on 
combating terrorism and adopted by the European Council under the Irish Presidency in March 
2004. This objective included the need to continue to investigate the links between extreme 
religious or political beliefs, as well as socio-economic and other factors, and support for terrorism, 
with the aim of identifying appropriate policy responses. 
                                                 
19 Glenn Audenaert, Patrick Stevens, in: Knack, 3 August 2005. 
20 Paul Rietjens, ‘België, de EU en het jihadi-terrorisme’, in: Studia Diplomatica, VX, 2007, Supplement 1. 
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Later on, Belgian diplomats were also adamant to make sure that tackling the factors or root causes 
which can lead to radicalisation and recruitment, in Europe and internationally – as a first objective 
to prevent people from turning to terrorism – was clearly included in the EU’s Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy, which has been elaborated by the British Presidency after the 2005 London attacks. The 
Strategy was adopted by the European Council in December of that year.  
 
The EU Strategy is based on four pillars: Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Respond. The first pillar, 
‘Prevent’, is to be understood as ‘stemming the radicalisation process by tackling the root causes 
which can lead to radicalisation and recruitment’. In its first draft however, the EU Strategy 
identified ‘Pursue’ (‘chasing and investigating terrorists and their networks across our border’) as 
the first pillar of EU counterterrorism. Due to the diplomatic efforts of a number of like-minded 
countries, including Belgium, the root causes approach prevailed.  
 
These countries have always maintained that international and intra-EU cooperation against jihadi 
terrorism will only be successful if the circumstances are addressed by which specific individuals 
are receptive to radicalisation, and why ultimately some of them turn into terrorists. Without 
acknowledging the dynamics that lead these individuals down this path, so they warned, the EU and 
its member states will never be able to stay abreast of events, and will constantly be confronted with 
the situation that for every ‘radicalised would-be terrorist’ caught, a new one is in the making, the 
source of potential recruits being seemingly inexhaustible. 
 
At the end of 2006, the EU decided to henceforth forsake the use of the words ‘root causes’ and 
now instead prefers other terms, such as ‘underlying conditions’ or ‘conditions conducive to the 
spread of terrorism’, which is the expression that has been endorsed in the UN Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy. The reason for this shift in wording (the EU still used the words ‘root causes’ in its own 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2005), was the experience of the EU in discussions with third 
countries, especially at the United Nations. Those discussions had indicated that the term was open 
to misinterpretation. The word ‘causes’, in particular, was sometimes misused by those who would 
like to imply that some terrorist acts could be excused or justified, by seeking to establish an 
automatic causal link between circumstances and, as a direct result of them, terrorism. 
 
Self-radicalisation being extremely fluid, Belgian authorities have shown great reluctance to 
quantify the jihadi threat in Belgium, at least publicly. As the assassination of the Dutch movie 
director Theo van Gogh has indicated, it is not necessarily the individuals under surveillance that 
ultimately will act. The same goes for radical mosques. In the beginning of the 2000s, it was 
customary to mention that ten percent of the mosques on Belgian soil were ‘radical’. Afterwards, it 
was realised that in some cases this depended very much on one single individual and, even more 
important, that radicalisation increasingly was taking place outside customary meeting places such 
as mosques. 
 
Radicalisation is not an easy process to come to grips with. Like many other European countries, 
Belgium too has developed its own national action plan against radicalisation.  
 
After the Gulf War of 1991 and, especially, the Mellouk and Zaoui operations police and 
intelligence services had noticed that a process of radicalisation and recruitment was taking place 
around the Algerian GIA-cells. The anti-terrorism agency of the Belgian Government, the 
aforementioned GIA (Groupe Interforces Anti-terroriste), was tasked with elaborating the principles 
for dealing with this. But only after 9/11 did the Minister of the Interior, Antoine Duquesne, charge 
his services with the elaboration of a comprehensive anti-radicalisation plan. Along this process, it 
was called by different names, from ‘Plan Iraq’, over ‘Plan Mosque’, until it was formerly adopted 
in 2006 in its final form as ‘Plan Radicalism’. The change of name reflects the growing realization 
that, as mentioned before, religion is not the key to understanding today’s radicalisation process. 
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From what is publicly known, it is clear that the Belgian authorities have gone to great lengths to 
make clear that not Islam is being targeted, but instead extremist and terrorist acts of whatever 
origin or justification. The plan concentrates on the surveillance of violent, racist, xenophobic and 
anti-Semite messages, conveyed through the Internet, radio, television programmes, imams, cultural 
centres, propaganda and groups. For every issue one law enforcement service is put in charge, with 
other agencies assisting.  
 
Furthermore, the Plan also seeks to empower moderates and to enhance an atmosphere of security 
among autochtone and immigrant communities alike. This seems to be working. In Belgium 
opinion polls indicate a high level of public confidence in the police forces. Moreover as mentioned 
by Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt in his October 2005 State of the Union, all indicators show a 
decreasing sense of insecurity among the population at large. 
 
In its actual form, the Belgian Plan Radicalism still privileges tackling the messenger and the 
message. However necessary, it might prove to be insufficient. De-radicalisation will not be 
achieved as long as the circumstances are not addressed by which specific individuals turn into 
terrorists, both in Europe and elsewhere. 
 
Within the police forces, one is clearly aware of the need to go further, judging from the questions 
raised by Glenn Audenaert, the leading counterterrorism officer of the federal police: ‘We need to 
find an answer to the following questions: can we identify the root causes of the radicalisation 
process; can we subsequently understand its dynamics; can we understand and/or explain the 
evolution from radicalisation to actual jihadi terrorism; and, finally, can we locate radicalisation 
and/or terrorism and subsequently anticipate it?’ He realises that the primary source of knowledge 
undoubtedly resides in the Muslim communities themselves, as well as in academia. He has 
therefore proposed a long-term co-operation between Muslim communities, academics and law 
enforcement, the objective being to transcend scepticism and mistrust among the three prospective 
partners and to create a ‘win-win’ situation for all the actors involved in the process. If some form 
of understanding can be reached, he has pointed out, initiatives might gradually become reality, 
insofar as they have the final objective of identifying and subsequently eradicating the domestic 
root causes that are common to all terrorist groups.21 
 
Most of the de-radicalisation strategy will have to take place at the local level, since the root causes 
of radicalisation and terrorism are mainly local too. So, measures taken can best go from local 
authorities to national authorities and not vice versa, because each city has its own realities and 
problems. So the government encourages mayors to take measures facilitating the process of 
integration. It goes without saying that maintaining open communication channels with for example 
community-based social or sports organisations or centres might prove to be vital. Consequently, 
proximity police, educators and social workers play an essential role.22 As explained by Glenn 
Audenaert: ‘Police forces need to focus on their performances and on the sociological environment, 
in which they evolve. […] police forces need to integrate their action into the entire security 
community as well as in the overall dynamic of the society they serve’.23 That said, local authorities 
might need to consider enhancing multicultural awareness programmes for police units operating in 
specific city districts. This includes taking care that local agencies, including police forces, reflect 
the diversity of society itself – a difficult endeavour in today’s polarised environment, to say the 
least. 
 
                                                 
21 Glenn Audenaert, ‘De-radicalisation and the Role of Police Forces’, in: Rik Coolsaet (ed.), Jihadi Terrorism and the 
Radicalisation Challenge in Europe. London, Ashgate, 2007. 
22 Vers une politique locale de sécurité intégrale. Brussels, Interior Ministry, Direction générale Politique de Sécurité et 
de Prévention, 2007. 
23 See note 20. 
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Safeguarding Fundamental Rights 
 
A last distinctive feature of the Belgian counterterrorism approach is the systematic reference to 
fundamental rights. This reluctance of eroding fundamental rights in the name of the fight against 
terrorism and the concern for accountability are largely shared by all actors involved, officials as 
well as politicians.24 
 
In 2003 at the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, Minister of Foreign Affairs Louis 
Michel explained this Belgian concern as follows: 
 
‘In this context, the Commission on Human Rights has a crucial role to play in guaranteeing that the 
international community's action against terrorism complies with the fundamental principles of 
human rights. Only by respecting human rights can the fight against terrorism lead to long-lasting 
results. Fighting terrorism cannot be a pretext for moving away from the fundamental principles of 
the impartial state, or for preventing the normal democratic operation of the rule of law. The end 
does not justify all means.  
Fighting the deep-rooted causes of terrorism definitely helps reinforce human rights. We cannot 
avoid the political and economic breeding ground that fosters terrorism.’  
 
The law enforcement apparatus is clearly in line with this governmental position. ‘History indeed 
teaches us that a democracy in danger needs more democracy, certainly not less,’ according to 
Glenn Audenaert.25 This apprehension is at the core of the Belgian refusal to consider ethnic 
profiling as a means of identifying potential terrorists. It has undoubtedly also played a role in 
shaping the official Belgian position on issues such as the CIA-flights and secret detention centres, 
or when it became known that the Brussels-based banking consortium Swift, the nerve center of the 
global banking industry, had provided financial records at the request of the CIA and the FBI, 
without seeking individual court-approved warrants or subpoenas, and without informing the 
Belgian government. 
 
Paul Rietjens, the former ‘focal point’ for terrorism issues at the Permanent Representation of 
Belgium to the European Union, has stressed that this point was also a permanent Belgian emphasis 
during the elaboration of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy.26 
 
The same concern is also present in the issue of terrorism financing. In Belgium, it must be 
demonstrated in each case that the group giving financial support actually constitutes a terrorist 
group, before being able to freeze their assets. In the past, FATF members have therefore criticised 
Belgium for what they consider sub-optimal performance, under the agreed FATF standards on 
asset freezing.  
 
As part of the mechanisms for safeguarding fundamental rights, judges play a central role in all 
state actions related to terrorism. However, the tension between fundamental rights and 
counterterrorism remains a delicate balancing act. As mentioned earlier, the Belgian Constitutional 
Court (Court of Arbitration) partly annulled the 2003 governmental act on special investigation 
methods on 21 December 2004. In its ruling the Court stressed the need for an independent and 
impartial judicial officer – the examining magistrate rather than the public prosecutor – to supervise 
the use of these methods, which are considered serious infringements on privacy. A new bill on 
special investigation methods was tabled by the government in the House of Representatives on 28 
October 2005 (and adopted in December) in order not only to draw conclusions from that judgment, 
but also to improve the investigation methods used in the fight against terrorism and serious and 
                                                 
24 See also Koen Dassen, note 14. 
25 Glenn Audenaert, in: De Morgen, 29 March 2005. 
26 See note 19. 
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organized crime.27 In July 2007, the Constitutional Court annulled additional, but rather minor 
aspects of this Act, in particular about its application to fugitives and the status of informers. 
 
Nevertheless, due to this extreme caution shown by the Belgian authorities not to encroach upon 
fundamental rights, there have been relatively lesser tensions between lawyers and human rights 
activists, on the one hand, and the Belgian law enforcement apparatus and the government, on the 
other hand, compared to neighbouring European countries. 
 
Conclusions 
Building on the expertise gained from dealing with the early Islamist terrorists in the 1980s and the 
Algerian GIA in the 1990s, Belgium has succeeded in dismantling eight major networks and 
convicting more than 60 suspected terrorists. One of the reasons explaining this success is the close 
cooperation that has been established between the intelligence community and the police. In 
Belgium too, counterterrorism has become much more efficient. Moreover, the Belgian 
counterterrorism community is particularly aware of the danger of panic reactions, as they could be 
witnessed in some European countries. Early experiences with radical Islamism and jihadi terrorism 
have indeed permitted to build up the indispensable expertise and awareness of this challenge, so as 
to avoid these hitches when jihadi terrorism gained traction in the 1990s. 
 
Jihadi activism and terrorism in Belgium is no island, entire of itself. It reflects the same Europe-
wide evolution of radical Islamism and jihadi terrorism. Immigrant communities with an Arab-
Muslim background have acted as a sounding board for all the frustrations that run across the 
Arabo-Muslim and the Muslim world. And as in other parts of the world, radicalisation in Europe is 
primarily grounded in local root causes. 
 
Even if one lacks precise instruments to quantify the degree of radicalisation, authorities and social 
workers alike have noticed an increasing tendency to radicalise. This in itself should not be viewed 
with excessive alarm. Being radical is not illegal. Moreover, the Belgian counterterrorism 
community is evidently aware that radicalism can take a wide variety of forms and appearances – 
and that it certainly is not limited to Arab-Muslim communities alone. It can be expressed through a 
political, religious or social discourse. It can be non-violent or violent. When violent, the Belgian 
counterterrorism community knows, it is always the action of a few within the larger group or 
community whose fate is at stake and whose plight they invoke to try to justify their acts. Radical 
groups still remain a marginal minority within the Muslim communities. They form fringe groups 
that act as self-declared vanguard groups. In all past processes of radicalisation throughout history 
the number of individuals who chose violence as their privileged method has been extremely small. 
Radicalisation leading to violence, and especially its systematic form, namely terrorism, is indeed 
only the far end of a wide array of possible radical attitudes and expressions. It cannot be overcome 
but with the cooperation of the communities that are most affected by it. 
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